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No. 9182

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UJA~

'
(I

r-

L

D

i..·'~ ...
DAIRY ROWLEY, _
1 :.~· F? 5- 1960
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-···-·c;;~;k, -s-~-P~~-;;,~·-e;~~-ri~···iii~........~
:MILFORD CITY, a Municipal Corpoh
ration of the State of Utah; R. L.
KIZER as Mayor of Milford City;
A. S. WHITTAKER, JOHN DAVIS,
\V. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and J.
N. WESTON, as City Councilmen of
said Milford City; V. M. BURNS, as
City Recorder of said Milford City;
ELWOOD JEFFE.RSON and
ALENE JEF:B,ERSON, his wife; and
MIKE L. BRIMBERRY and DOROTHY BRIMBERRY, his wife; FIRS'T
DOE, SECOND DOE and THIRD
DOE, .
Defendants, and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
On Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Beaver County
RoN. WILL L. HoYT, Judge
DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAISY ROWLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.MILFORD CITY, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah; R. L.
KIZER as Mayor of Milford City;
A. S. WHITTAI{ER, JOHN DAVIS,
W. S. BOLTON, M. S. BOWN and J.
N. WESTON, as City Councilmen of
said Milford City; V. M. BURNS, as
City Recorder of said Milford City;
E L W 0 0 D JEFFERSON an d
ALENE JEFFERSON, his wife; and
MIKE L. BRIMBERRY and DOROTHY BRIMBERRY, his wife; FIRST
DOE, SECOND DOE and THIRD
DOE,
Defendants, and Appellants.

No. 9182

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Mrs. Daisy Rowley,
a resident and taxpayer of the City of Milford, Utah,
acting in her own behalf and for and in behalf of all
other taxpayers of said Milford City to have a certain
purported sale of real property made by 11ilford City at
a purported special meeting of the Mayor and four of
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the City Council of :M:ilford City held on November 21,
1958, at 8 p.m., to Elwood Jefferson and Mike L. Brimberry for a consideration of $2500.00 declared illegal and
void, and to have a Quitclaim Deed for such property
dated December 27, 1958, made by the Mayor and City
Recorder of Milford City to said purported purchasers
pursuant to authority of such meeting, declared to be
null and void and ordered delivered up and cancelled,
and requiring said purported purchaser to remove from
said premises certain structures alleged to have been
placed by them upon the premises, UPON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
I. That said special meeting of the Mayor and four
City Councihnen of J\1ilford City held on November 21,
1958, at 8 p.m. was not a legal meeting for the reason that
no notice of said special meeting was given as required
by law and by the City ordinances of Milford City, to
City ·Councilman W. S. Bolton, who did not attend said
meeting (Complaint Paragraph 9).
2. That the two City Councilmen who voted in favor
of such sale were influenced by considerations of their
employment by one of the purported purchasers, or
members of his immediate family, to vote in favor of
the purported sale (Complaint Paragraph 9).
3. That such purported sale was made for a grossly
inadaequate consideration, without either soliciting other
offers, or allowing other prospective purchasers to bid
on the property (Complaint Paragraph 9).
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4. That the property affected by such purported
sale and other property was prior to on or about March
9, 1939, dedicated as a public park and playground for
Milford City by its governing body, namely, its Mayor
and City Council, and that from on or about March 9,
1939, down to the time of filing the plaintiff's Complaint
the land affected by such purported sale has been dedicated as and used as a public park and playground for
the use and benefit of the inhabitants of Milford City,
and such property so dedicated as a public park could not
be legally sold at the time of such purported sale.
(Complaint Paragraphs 5 and 9).
The case was tried before the court sitting without
a jury on October 22 to 24, 1959; both parties rested and
the case was argued by counsel for both parties. On or
about November 9, 1959, the defendants tendered their
respective Supplemental Answers and moved the court
for an Order permitting them to file and serve such
Supplemental Answers. The court overruled and denied
the motions and an intermediate appeal was taken by
defendants from such Order.
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
The plaintiff agrees with the Statements of Facts
set forth in Appellants' Brief, but invites an examination
of the proposed Supplemental Answers for a detailed
statement of all acts alleged to have occurred after the
trial and to the time of filing of the motions for leave to
file the Supplemental Answers.
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STATEJ\1ENT OF POINTS
FIRST : The tendered Supplemental Answers do not
set forth facts material to the issues in this action, and
hence should not be permitted to be filed.
SECOND: The tendered Supplemental Answers set
forth facts which when considered alone would constitute
no defense to the cause of action pleaded in the Complaint,
and which, if and when considered in connection with
suggested possible future occurrences and possible future
actions of Milford City Council at some subsequently
called meeting in making a sale of the property to the
defendants, Jefferson and Brimberry, or someone else,
and ordering a Deed made to such purchaser or purchasers, which events may or may not occur if the proceedings in this action were ordered stayed, could at
most give rise to a new and independent action, if the
legality of such meeting or meetings and any Deed made
pursuant to the authority thereof is questioned by a
resident and taxpayer of Milford ·City, and hence the
tendered Supplemental Answers should not be allowed
to be filed, or any Order made staying the proceedings
in this case to await the possible happening of such
possible future events.
THIRD : The rna tter of allowing the filing of supplemental pleadings rests within the discretion of the
trial court and the allowance or denial thereof will not
be reversed on appeal in the absence of a manifest abuse
of discretion by the trial court. There was no manifest
abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying defend-
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ants motions to file the tendered Supplemental Answers.
ARGUMENT
FIRST : The tendered Supplemental Answers did
not set forth facts which are material to the issues of
the case, and hence their filing was properly disallowed.
Rule 15(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to the filing of supplemental pleadings
is taken verbatum from Rule 15(d) of the Federal
Rules, and in Sec. 455, page 945, Vol. 1, Barron
and Holtzoff Federal Practice and Procedure
it is stated in commenting on Rule 15(d) of the
Federal Rules : A supplemental answer should
be allowed to be filed only when the matter to be
set forth embraces other and further defenses
which arose after the original answer was filed
and which relate to the plaintiff's claim for relief
stated in the original complaint.
Sec. 104-13-13 U.C.A. 1943, in force before the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted provided: Either party may be allowed to make a
supplemental complaint, answer or reply, alleging
facts material to the case, which have happened
or have come to his knowledge after the filing
of the former pleading.
10 Hillyer Forms of Pleading and Practice,
Pages 9572-9573. Supplemental Pleadings. Introductory Note: ". . . . The court may properly
refuse leave to file a supplemental answer if
timely application is not made therefor, or if
the pleading sought to be filed does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a defense, but not
because of a mere defect in the statement of the
defense."
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BARTON et al. v. HACKNEY, 224 P 2d, 995,
Kansas, 1950. 2. The filing of amended or supplemental pleading is a matter within sound
discretion of trial court, and to secure the reversal
of ruling refusing to allow a party to amend or
supplement his pleading, he must show affirmatively that the proposed pleading was material and
that its refusal was a clear abuse of judicial
discretion.
Il\fPERIAL LAND CO. et al v. IMPERIAL
IRR. DIST. et al. 16l P. 116, California, 1916.
5. Facts to be alleged in a supplemental pleading
must relate to and be material to the original
case.
The purported sale which the plaintiff seeks to have
, declared illegal and void on the grounds alleged in the
Complaint, is the purported sale made at a purported
special meeting of the Mayor and four members of the
Milford City Council held on November 21, 1958, at
8 p.m., and the Deed which plaintiff seeks to have declared
illegal and ordered delivered up and cancelled is the Deed
dated December 27, 1958, identified in the plaintiff's
Complaint. The issues joined are whether such special
meeting was a legal meeting and whether the purported
sale made at such special meeting was a valid sale, and
whether the Deed issued to the defendants Jefferson
and Brimberry under authority of such special meeting
is a valid Deed or whether the same should be ordered
delivered up and cancelled. The n1atters alleged in the
proposed Supplemental Answers are not material to and
can have no bearing upon these issues raised by the
original pleadings.
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If the special meeting and the Deed of Conveyance
pursuant to purported authority of such meeting were
illegal at their inception, then the facts pleaded in the
Supplemental Answer could not affect the illegality of
said special meeting and said Deed. If all of the facts
pleaded in the Supplemental Answers could be proved
these facts would be immaterial to the issues of the case.
If the alleged special meeting was illegal at its inception,
the additional facts pleaded in the Supplemental Answers, if proved, could not convert such illegal special
meeting into a legal meeting, or breathe legality into the
Deed which was illegal at its inception. The facts pleaded
in the tendered Supplemental Answers are wholly immaterial to the issues in the case, and the motions to allow
their filing were properly denied.
SECOND : If the proceedings were ordered stayed,
as suggested on page 12 of Appellants' Brief, and if at
some time in the future some other meeting of the City
Council of Milford City was held at which the property
involved in this action was ordered sold to the defendants
Jefferson and Brimberry, or to any other person or
persons, and pursuant to such authority a conveyance
of the property was made to such purchaser or purchasers, such subsequent transactions could have no bearing
on the legality of the special meeting held on November
21, 1958~ at 8 p.m., or the purported sale made at such
special meeting, or upon the legaility of the Deed dated
December 27, 1958, at issue in this case, and the most
that the happenings of such possible future events, when
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coupled with the facts alleged in the tendered Supplemental Answers, could do, would be to give rise to a new
and independent cause of action, if the legality thereof is
questioned by a resident and taxpayer of Milford City.
It is a matter of mere conjecture whether any meeting or meetings of the City Council of Milford City will
be held at any time in the future, at which the matter
of the sale of the property in question will be considered
and/ or authorized, or whether any officer or officers of
Milford City will ever at any future time execute any
purported Deed of Conveyance to anyone for the property in question. If any such acts do occur and the legality of such acts is questioned, the same would of necessity
have to be determined in a new and independent action.
The filing of supplemental pleadings which allege
matters which can only be determined in a new and independent action should be denied.
NATIONAL BANK OF ANADARKO v.
FIRST N~T. BANK OF ANADARKO, 134 P.
866, Oklahoma, 1913. 2. The facts embodied in a
supplemental petition under the code must relate
to the cause of action set forth in the original
petition and must be in aid thereof. It is not
proper to bring into a case by a supplemental
petition new facts which have arisen since the
action was commenced and which by themselves, if
they are sufficient, constitute a new and independent cause of action, ·without reference to the facts
alleged in the original pleading. In such case
relief should be had by a new and independent
action.
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STEPHANI v. ABBOTT et al. 30 P 2d, 1033,
California, 1934. 4. Permission to file supplemental complaint rests in trial court's discretion,
provided it is in furtherance of and consistent
with original complaint and is not new or independent cause of action.
LE\VIS & QUEEN v. S. EDMONSON &
SONS et al. 248 P 2d, 973, California, 1952. 12.
A party should not be permitted to so amend his
pleadings as to raise a new cause of action or a
new defense.
THIRD: Motions to file supplemental pleadings are
addressed to the discretion of the trial court and their
allowance or denial will not be reversed on appeal in the
absence of a manifest abuse of discretion.
Mazie ERICKSON, Executrix, etc., Plaintiff
and Appellant, v. Clyde D. BOOTHE, Defendant
and Respondent, 274 P 2d, 460, California, 1954.
3. A motion to file a supplemental complaint is
addressed to the sound legal discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of
a manifest abuse of that discretion.
Henry S. GREENSTONE, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross- Appellant, v. CLARETIAN
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CLARE.TVILLE,
California, a corporation, Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent, 343 P 2d, 161, California,
1959. 16. It was within discretion of trial court
to deny motion of defendant to file supplemental
answer and reviewing court would not reverse
order entered thereon unless abuse of discretion
·was manifest in record.'
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FEDERAL LIFE INS. CO. v. BARTLET'T,
80 P 2d, 587, Oklahoma, 1938. 2. The allowance of
filing of supplemental pleadings is within discretion of trial court, and allowance or refusal of
supplemental pleadings will not be reversed on
appeal in absence of clear abuse of discretion.
It was no abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
refuse to grant defendants' motions for leave to file the
Supplemental Answers which did not state facts constituting any defense to the cause of action pleaded in
the plaintiff's Complaint.
CONCLUSION
The matters alleged in the tendered Suppemental
Answers are not material to the issues in this case and
can constitute no defense to the cause of action pleaded
in the Complaint. The matters referred to on page 12 of
Appellants' Brief, which may or may not occur at some
future time if the proceedings were stayed, could at most
give rise to a new and independent action, if any such
acts or events do occur at some future time, and their
legality is then contested. Clearly there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying the
motions of the defendants for leave to file their tendered
Supplemental Answers. The decision of the trial judge
in denying the motions is the only decision which could
properly have been made. It would have been an abuse
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of discretion on the part of the trial judge to have
granted the motions, and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respecfully submitted,

DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Respondent
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